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DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR IN RESIDENCE
LECTURE: A USER'S GUIDE TO
PROGRESSIVE FEDERALISM
Heather K. Gerken*
I want to start by thanking the extraordinary faculty of Hofstra Law
School for this honor. It's wonderful to be here, and you have treated me
with extraordinary graciousness.
Today I'm going to offer you a "user's guide" to progressive
federalism. I should emphasize that while I'll be attaching the word
progressive to federalism, my main point is that federalism doesn't have
a political valence. We often associate federalism with conservatism, but
that's pure foolishness on our part. Federalism is a powerful weapon no
matter what your political preferences. It can be a source of resistance
and, more importantly, it can provide incentives for moderation in the
long run. The reason I'll talk to you today about "progressive"
federalism is that, at least until the inauguration of President Trump,
progressives have been pretty skeptical of federalism. If you are trying to
convince people that states and localities play a useful role in our
democracy, it's progressives you have to win over.
I must admit I feel a bit uncomfortable attaching a political term to
my work. When I speak to an academic audience, I always describe the
"nationalist" case for federalism.' But when I speak, I find that it's easier
to use the more intuitive term. And the nationalist's worries about
federalism align pretty closely with the reasons that progressives are
skeptical of federalism. Both groups worry about the "isms," fearing that
federalism-and its homely cousin, localism-are aligned with racism,
parochialism, and cronyism. Much of this skepticism is rooted in the
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1. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123
YALE L.J. 1889 (2013) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism]; Heather K.
Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REv. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Forewordj.
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ugly role that states' rights played in the resistance to abolition, Brown v.
Board of Education,2 and the Civil Rights Act. Those worries once led
the great William Riker to insist that if "one disapproves of racism, one
should disapprove of federalism." 3 As I'll explain at the end of this
lecture,4 that argument rests on an outdated factual premise and a deep
misunderstanding of how rights work.
For now, though, I thought it would be most useful to talk about the
kinds of tools federalism provides progressives (and conservatives)
during a period in which they are out of power. Let's face it, that's what
people are talking about these days. But then I want to turn your focus to
the more general (and more important) claim that has long animated my
work-that states and localities play an important role in a well-
functioning democracy.' As I've noted in describing the "nationalist"
school of federalism, of which I'm a founding member, federalism plays
a crucial role in "improving national politics, knitting together the
national polity, improving national policymaking, and entrenching
national power and national policies."6
So what can progressives do during a period in which they've lost
control of the Presidency and Congress? They can take a chapter from
conservatives' playbook and use their control over blue cities and states
to shape the national agenda, influence national policy, and encourage
political compromise.
I. UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
One of the features in federalism that is most understudied-at least
by constitutional theorists-is how much the federal government
depends on states and localities to carry out its policies. The federal
government doesn't have enough resources to enforce its own drug laws,
carry out its immigration policies, administer its own health care laws, or
implement its own environmental policies. Indeed, as the federal
government has moved into one traditional state domain after another, it
hasn't displaced state government. Instead, the federal government has
consistently found it easier to enlist the states' existing administrative
apparatuses in the federal project rather than build its own from scratch.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 34-39.
5. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Windsor's Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights
and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REv. 587, 596-600 (2014) [hereinafter Gerken, Windsor's Mad Genius];
Heather K Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1963-64, 1968 (2014) [hereinafter
Gerken, Loyal Opposition]; Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1, at 21-33.
6. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism, supra note 1, at 1894.
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We call these arrangements "cooperative federalism," but we often
overlook how many opportunities they create for what Jessica Bulman-
Pozen and I term "uncooperative federalism." 7 States serve as the agents
of the federal government, and you only have to spend a few days
studying administrative law or corporate law to realize just how
powerful an agent can be.
One of the tools of "uncooperative federalism" is simply refusing to
partner with the federal government. The GOP-controlled federal
government can't put cops on every beat or a bureaucrat at every
desk. Examples abound. Sometimes states just refuse to participate in
federal programs. For instances, states simply refused to carry out
parts of the PATRIOT Act.' The same is true of immigration policy and
environmental regulations. 9
Perhaps the most spectacular example of uncooperative federalism
we've seen in recent years has been marijuana enforcement. Federal
dependence on states is so pronounced in criminal law that Professor
Robert Mikos insists that states can "nullify" federal marijuana
law simply by withdrawing enforcement resources, as did Colorado
and Washington.10
States don't just opt out of federal programs. Sometimes they
engage in so-called cooperative regimes but do so begrudgingly. Rather
than refuse to carry out federal law, they slow walk it or undermine it
from within. Think about what happened to the No Child Left Behind
Act, which was to be a signature reform of the Bush Administration. The
states manipulated testing standards and put up all manner of
roadblocks. Eventually the Bush Administration effectively gave up on
the whole enterprise, giving the states so many waivers that the program
was essentially gutted."
Sometimes state resistance doesn't involve slow walking a
programmatic commitment, but taking it in a new and unexpected
7. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1258 (2009).
8. Id. at 1278-80.
9. Id. at 1276-78 (discussing environmental regulations). As to immigration policy, one need
only read the newspaper to notice the role sanctuary cities and states are playing in resisting federal
immigration policies.
10. Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States'
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1421, 1425 (2009); see also
Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the Persistence of Federalism in an
Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 779-81 (2015).
11. For a description, see Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a
Detente?, 59 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 997, 1014-16 (2015).
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direction. For instance, during the 1990s the Republican Governors of
Michigan and Wisconsin created the early models of "Welfare to Work"
inside the very welfare scheme they aimed to topple. They thus used
federal funds to challenge the program that was funding them. Those
models jumpstarted a national debate and eventually pushed Bill Clinton
and congressional Democrats to overhaul the existing welfare system. 12
We saw a similar effort when Massachusetts used Medicaid funds
to help enact "Romneycare," which would become the model
for Obamacare.
Uncooperative federalism is often paired with uncooperative
localism.13 We're witnessing a clear example of uncooperative localism
right now with the sanctuary city movement. Cities have simply refused
to assist with certain homeland security and deportation efforts, and the
federal government lacks the staff and resources to carry out those
policies itself. Little wonder that the Trump Administration is so
panicked about sanctuary cities that it's threatened to cut off all federal
funding to sanctuary cities. 14
None of this is to say that states and localities can't be brought to
heel. Attorney General Jeff Sessions could change the marijuana
equation by bringing a few prosecutions in Colorado. President Trump
can't cut off all federal funding to sanctuary cities under existing law,
but there are constitutional ways for him to use federal spending power
to pressure cities to comply. Still, even if President Trump can win one
battle or another against blue states, he cannot win the war. If he spends
political capital and legal resources on marijuana, it'll be harder for him
to battle in the immigration or environmental arena. Social scientists
have long talked about the power of the "street-level bureaucrat" to
shape the law.16 If you look carefully, though, you'll realize that this sort
of resistance is rarely confined to the street.
12. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 7, at 1274-76.
13. See id. at 1310 n.188; Kathleen S. Morris, Uncooperative Localism (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 21) (on file with the author).
14. See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768,
82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that my clinic
helped file the first-in-the-nation challenge to that executive order. See Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 4:17-cv-00485-DMR (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31,
2017).
15. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575-85 (2012) (spending clause
ruling).
16. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
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II. SPWLOVERS
States and localities possess another, important power in "our
federalism": spillovers.1 7 When one state regulates, it often affects its
neighbors. We see spillovers all the time in our highly interconnected
regime. Think, for instance, about who really sets emissions standards in
the United States. You'd guess it was the federal EPA. It's not. It's
California. California sets higher standards for itself than the federal
government has set for the nation. And no car company can afford to
ignore those standards because no company can give up on the
California market."8 After all, California has the sixth largest economy in
the world, beating out France.19 Some of my colleagues have written
about "superstatutes"20 and "superprecedent." 2 1 In my view, California is
a "superstate." 2 2 It can enact national regulations even when it's
nominally regulating for itself
III. ENFORCING FEDERAL LAW
California has created another tool of progressive federalism, one
readily available to other states. It prohibits businesses from engaging in
unlawful activities, a definition that includes violations of federal law.
That innovative provision licenses not only the state attorney general,
but also counties and large cities to enforce it.23 In effect, it turns state
attorneys general and city attorneys into a standing army for enforcing
federal law. This tool is likely to be particularly important in challenging
President Trump's deregulatory agenda. The Trump Administration
17. For an overview, see Heather K Gerken & James T. Dawson, Living Under Someone
Else's Law, DEMOCRACY J., Spring 2015, at 42; Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political
Safeguards ofHorizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57 (2014).
18. See Gerken & Dawson, supra note 17, at 43; Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 17, at 63.
19. Alison Vekshin, California Overtakes France to Become Sixth-Largest Economy,
BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2016, 6:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-06-
14/califomia-overtakes-france-to-become-sixth-largest-economy.
20. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 8 (2010).
21. Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in 'Superprecedent'?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/weekinreview/so-do-you-believe-in-superprecedent.html.
22. Gerken & Holtzblatt, supra note 17, at 103.
23. See generally THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, ABA SECTION OF LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT LAW 2006 (giving an overview of California Business and Professions Code section
17200); Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public
Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST
ADVOCACY 51, 54-56, 58-59 (Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2009). For an excellent example of how
this power might be deployed, see Eliza Lehmer, Dissenting by Enforcing: Overcooperative
Federalism and State and Local Enforcement of Federal Law, YALE L. & POL'Y REV. INTER ALIA
(forthcoming) (on file with the author).
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may-as have prior administrations-refuse to enforce or under-enforce
certain federal regulations. But it takes a lot more work to erase federal
law no matter how fast Congress works. That means that federal
regulations that might have lain dormant during the Trump
Administration can be kept alive in California and any other state that
follows its lead.
IV. CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
There is one, final way in which states can be a tool for progressive
values. It creates the necessary conditions for change. When we think
about democratic change, we usually look to the First Amendment, not
federalism. We forget, however, that federalism and localism play an
important role in effecting change. Indeed, social movements have long
used state and local policymaking as an organizing tool, a rallying cry, a
testing ground for their ideas.24
The same-sex marriage movement is one of the most recent
examples. Proponents of marriage equality used states and localities as
staging grounds for organizing and debate. In doing so, they didn't just
change policy; they changed how we, as a nation, think about this issue.
It was precisely that pairing of politicking and policymaking that
explains why equality norms run so deep that the Supreme Court's
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges2 -a decision that would surely have
been quite controversial not so long ago-was widely celebrated and
generated little opposition.
As I've argued elsewhere,2 6 we see lots of examples of where core
parts of the equality project are pushed through state and local sites. Just
think about the work being done on immigration, policing, sentencing,
and the living wage movement. National policy, after all, is a giant gear
to move. As with a clock, you need movement from lots of small,
interlocking gears to move a bigger one. Federalism and the First
Amendment are those interlocking gears. 27 Debate leads to policy,
which in turn provides a rallying point for still more debate. Social
movements include pragmatic insiders, forging bargains from within,
and principled outsiders, demanding more and better from 'without.
24. For an overview, see Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1, at 62-63; Gerken, Loyal
Opposition, supra note 5, at 1978-81.
25. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
26. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity: An Exploration of
Decentralization's Egalitarian Possibilities (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 591,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=2868032.
27. For an overview, see Gerken, Windsor's Mad Genius, supra note 5, at 592-600.
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V. WIDENING THE LENS
Now that I've given you a "progressive user's guide," let me widen
the lens, return to the more comfortable mode of speaking as an
academic, and talk about why federalism should matter to progressives
and conservatives alike. As I noted when I began, federalism is for
everyone. There's nothing inherently progressive or conservative about
federalism. Just as we witness uncooperative federalism with regard to
sanctuary cities and states, we also saw it with states' resistance to
Obamacare. We see progressive spillovers when California regulates
emissions or Minnesota prohibits the purchase of electricity generated at
new coal-fired plants.28 But we also see conservative spillovers when,
say, Texas insists on a more conservative curriculum and blue states
were forced to buy textbooks written for the Texas market, or when
Virginia's lax firearms rules resulted in New York City being flooded
with guns through the Iron Pipeline.29 As I noted earlier, federalism and
the First Amendment served as interlocking gears, moving debates
forward. But it moves all kinds of debates forward, from gun rights to
gay rights. Red states have used their power to shape the abortion debate
just as effectively as blue states have used theirs to shape the policing
debate. Progressives may hope that federalism will turn out to be a one-
way ratchet on their issues, but it won't. Nothing excuses either side
from suiting up and getting into the game of politics.
We should value the role that cities and states play in our
democracy no matter what our politics. Uncooperative federalism may
sound antithetical to certain legal values, but it's not antithetical to
democratic ones. It is good to have a source of friction, dissent, and
debate inside the behemoth we call the "Fourth Branch."3 0 Moreover,
federal dependence on states and localities creates incentives for
moderation and compromise. Just ask President Obama, who had to
compromise a great deal to bring Obamacare to the red states.31
President Trump may not have to cooperate with Democrats on the Hill,
but he's going to need the support of blue states and cities if he wants to
get things done.
We should also value spillovers. To be sure, it is uncomfortable to
recognize that we are all sometimes forced to live under someone else's
28. For an overview, see Gerken & Dawson, supra note 17, at 42-43.
29. For an overview, see id. at 43-44.
30. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 7, at 1285-87; Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1, at
40-41.
3 1. Heather Gerken & Ted Ruger, Real State Power Means Getting into the Obamacare
Game, HARv. Bus. REv. (Apr. 2, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/real-state-power-means-getting.
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law.32 But there are many democratic virtues associated with
spillovers.33 For example, in today's heated political environment, state
officials lack incentives to compromise with those from the other side.
But when a blue policy spills over into a red state (or vice versa),
legislators can't ignore the opposition. They must reach across state (and
party) lines to fix the problem. Spillovers thus force state and local
officials to do what they are supposed to do: politic, find common
ground, and negotiate a compromise that no one likes but everyone can
live with.34
The most important role that federalism plays is in furthering
change. Free speech is a precondition for democracy to function. These
days, however, dissenters have little problem getting their message out;
they have trouble getting it across.35 Federalism and localism matter to
anyone trying to get a message across. Federalism and localism supply
different platforms and different forms of advocacy for would-be
dissenters. By giving social movements a chance to "dissent by
deciding"-converting abstract appeals into concrete policies-
decentralization confers a variety of benefits on democracy's outliers
that the First Amendment, standing alone, cannot supply.3 6
Decentralization also facilitates agenda setting." When those
seeking change put in place a real-life instantiation of their ideas, the
majority can't ignore them, as majorities are wont to do.
Decentralization thus helps social movements shift the burden of inertia
and force the majority to engage. Federalism and localism also give
those who seek change a chance to move from the abstract to the
concrete. They don't have to talk about how a policy would work in
theory. They can show that it does work in practice. Better yet, it allows
advocates of change to build their movement one step a time. It is hard
to jumpstart a national movement. That's why virtually every national
movement began as a local one.
I recognize that my claim that federalism facilitates change will
seem like an odd claim to those who associate federalism with efforts to
hold back the tide of civil rights. But that was your father's federalism.
32. For an in-depth exploration, see Gerken & Dawson, supra note 17, at 42-44; Gerken &
Holtzblatt, supra note 17, at 69-78.
33. For a survey of those benefits, see Gerken & Dawson, supra note 17, at 44-50; Gerken &
Holtzblatt, supra note 17, at 89-97.
34. For an in-depth exploration, see Gerken & Dawson, supra note 17, at 47-49; Gerken &
Holtzblatt, supra note 17, at 93-95.
35. For further analysis, see Gerken, Loyal Opposition, supra note 5, at 1970-72.
36. Id. at 1979.
37. Id. at 1979-80.
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Today, federalism is sheared of sovereignty. States cannot shield their
discrimination from national norms, as they did during the days of Jim
Crow. If a national norm exists, the federal government can enforce it,
provided it's willing to spend the political capital to do so.
The problem these days isn't that federalism is an obstacle to
enforcing national equality norms. The problem is that we lack robust
national equality norms to enforce. Academics often unthinkingly blame
decentralization for shortfalls in equality. This idea ignores the fact that
we adopt a decentralized solution only when our national norm is to
tolerate shortfalls. Rather than condemning federalism for weak national
norms, we should focus on whether federalism makes it easier or harder
to change those norms going forward. In my view, decentralization plays
a central role in the process by which equality norms are constructed. 9
It is precisely because local and national politics constitute one
another, decentralization can be as much a tool for change as it is a tool
for preservation.
VI. WILL POLITICS OVERRUN FEDERALISM IN THE FUTURE?
The arguments I've offered in this talk have been the focus of my
work over the last decade or so. But I should note one lingering doubt
about the future. It's a worry that has less to do with federalism and
more to do with my other field, election law. It's a worry that has
crystallized in recent days as we've watched our politics unfold since
President Trump's inauguration. The worry, put succinctly, is that our
politics are quickly overtaking the institutions that were designed to
channel them.
I've always understood federalism to be one of many institutional
and legal strategies we use to instantiate pluralist politics. I also accept
what I take to be the fundamental premise of both my fields: Institutions
and legal rules shape politics. The rules of the game shape how the game
is played.
My worry-certainly not a new one-is that the gale forces of
polarization are putting more pressure on our governing institutions than
they can bear. And by "polarization," I am referring to the tribal
dimensions of polarization-the fact that both sides view the other's
positions with deep skepticism, even hostility. I worry about this shift
for a simple reason. The institutions that help politics work also depend
on politics to work. At some point, politics may become too powerful a
force for institutions like federalism to play this beneficial role.
38. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 1, at 13-14.
39. For development of this argument, see Gerken, supra note 26, at 3-4, 11-25.
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Federalism facilitates pluralist politics, but it also requires some
pluralism to get up and running. If the two parties view one another as
monsters,I'm not sure federalism can fix that problem.
I should emphasize that I mean only to raise questions, not offer
definitive answers. None of us know whether polarization is so powerful
that it will prevent democratic institutions from playing their usual,
salutary rolls. But one fact gives me pause. As my colleague, David
Schleicher, has pointed out, the forces of polarization seem to be
spreading across the globe despite substantial differences in institutional
structure and legal rules.40 No one, in short, has found a wind break.
Schleicher's point, combined with the marked departures from our
institutional norms we've seen just during the last year, makes me
wonder about the relationship between politics and institutions. If
polarization is a gale-force wind, then institutions that have served as
wind breaks in the past may not work in the same way going forward.
Legal scholars have always focused on the rules of the political game. If
we are now playing in a hurricane, the question is how much those rules
will matter going forward. No one knows the answer to this question,
but it's important we consider it going forward.
VII. CONCLUSION
Let me just close by returning to the themes with which I began.
While I've given you a progressive "user's guide," my overarching point
is that federalism isn't associated with any political position. It's for
everyone. In this respect, federalism is like the First Amendment. It isn't
a given that it will be used for good or for ill, to promote your preferred
politics or your opponents'. Instead, it is an essential part of a well-
functioning democracy. What we make of our democracy-well, that's
up to us.
40. David Schleicher, Things Aren't Going That Well Over There Either: Party Polarization
and Election Law in Comparative Perspective, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 433, 458-62 (2015).
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